The word belief in everyday language refers to a claim that we are certain of in varying degrees, that we have evidence for in varying degrees and that may or may not be true. We speak of belief when a young child strongly believes in Sinterklaas, just as we speak of belief when a person vaguely believes that she will receive a fine when parking her car in central Maastricht without a parking ticket. While both cases have varying certainty and varying likeliness to be true, we do not explicitly distinguish to what extent the belief is certain, backed by evidence or whether it is actually true.In philosophy it is specified what kind of belief is referred to. Further, a claim is only called a belief when its holder is certain of it; this means that hope and faith can be excluded from this definition of belief . Hereinafter I shall elaborate on three different kinds of belief and how they relate to knowledge in the realist framework.First, a belief based on evidence is closer to being knowledge than a belief without evidence. However, there are many beliefs that are false, despite being backed by some evidence. Surely the child believing in Sinterklaas has some evidence, such as having seen an actor dressed in the Sinterklaas costume, yet her belief is false. Second, let us assume the belief is true and backed by evidence. It can constitute knowledge, but the evidence on which it is based could too weak to conclude that true, evidence based beliefs are knowledge (Creel). Third, the evidence criterion is specified to exclude the possibility of weak evidence – the evidence needs to be so strong, that the belief is justified. Is then a belief knowledge, when it can be said to be justified and true? This is where opinions diverge. Creel states that according to the justification theory of knowledge, the justification of a claim needs to be conclusive to be called knowledge. Claims that for a long time a justified true belief (JTB) has been the standard account of knowledge. Both are closely related, and both have been challenged 1963 by Edmund Gettier.