阿曼的苏丹占有具有战略意义的位置，其北端位于霍尔木兹海峡，只有55km来自伊朗。所有海湾国家，阿曼有可能保持良好的关系，与美国和伊朗最努力的。这也许是因为它的宗教成分，以及其地理上的接近它的大邻居阿曼75%的人口是穆斯林的一个教派，ibadhi，逊尼派和什叶派都不。由于阿曼统治者不共享不安全感在Gulf州执政对什叶派大多数或相当可观的少数逊尼派政权感到恐惧，或随之而来的伊朗搅拌。事实上，在上世纪70年代，伊朗起到了稳定化的作用帮助镇压阿曼起义的佐法尔province.55 Politics Essay 代写
阿曼加入核不扩散条约在一月1997。它签署了与进入九月2006力SQP 2001六月国际原子能机构的全面保障监督协定。阿曼有很少或没有现有的核设施或专业知识，似乎没有计划投资在任何设施或在国家级培训。阿曼不是国际原子能机构的成员国，因此没有从事任何与公司技术合作。它已于2007十一月正式成为总督会会议的会员，其成员将于2008九月在大会的下一次会议上被占用。阿曼严重依赖石油出口，约占其GDP的40%。为探明储量小，阿曼一直在寻求其多样化的收入来源，比如投资于液化天然气。 Politics Essay 代写: The Sultanate Of The Oman Occupation
阿曼与美国签署了双边防务协议，允许美国获得1980阿曼军事设施，并与美国的战略关系依然强劲。该协议在2000换了另一个十年，显然是给我们部队进入几个空气领域，美国的弹药是预先定位的。这些基地是在操作持久自由行动和在持久自由行动和在伊拉克自由行动的初始阶段的初始阶段，尽管阿曼政府公开批评美国入侵。虽然报告显示，阿曼设施不再被使用，在一定程度上，他们曾经是，美国仍然是一个军事合作伙伴，提供12的F -阿曼2005.56 Politics Essay 代写
The Sultanate of Oman occupies a strategically significant position, with its northern tip located on the Strait of Hormuz, only 55km from Iran. Of all the GCC states, Oman has probably made the most effort to preserve good relations with both the US and Iran. This is perhaps because of its sectarian composition, as well as its geographic proximity to its larger neighbour 75% of Oman’s population are Ibadhi Muslims, a sect that is neither Sunni nor Shia. As a result Oman’s rulers do not share the sense of insecurity felt by Sunni regimes in Gulf states governing over Shia majorities or sizeable minorities, or their consequent fear of Iranian agitation. In fact, in the 1970s Iran played a stablising role by helping to suppress a revolt in Oman’s Dhofar province.55
Oman acceded to the NPT in January 1997. It signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in June 2001 with the SQP that came into force in September 2006. Oman has little or no existing nuclear infrastructure or expertise, and appears to have no plans to invest in either facilities or training on a national level. Oman is not yet a member of the IAEA and therefore has not engaged in any technical cooperation with the agency. It was formally recommended for membership at a meeting of the board of governors in November 2007; its membership will be taken up at the next meeting of the general conference in September 2008. Oman relies heavily on its oil exports, which account for some 40% of its GDP. As its proven reserves are small, Oman has sought to diversify its sources of revenue, for example by investing in liquefied natural gas.
Oman signed a bilateral defence agreement with the US in 1980 that granted America access to Omani military facilities, and its strategic relationship with the US remains strong. The agreement was renewed in 2000 for another ten years, apparently giving US forces access to several air fields where American munitions are pre-positioned. These bases were used during Operating Enduring Freedom and also during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and also during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, even though the Omani government publicly criticised the American invasion. Although reports indicate that the Omani facilities are no longer being used to the extent that they once were, the US remains a military partner, delivering 12 F-16Cs to Oman in 2005.56
Despite its military cooperation with the US from the early days of the Islamic Revolution, Oman also maintained good relations with Iran during the 1980s, strongly backing UN Security Council resolutions that called for an end to its war with Iraq. In a similar balancing act, Oman maintained diplomatic relations with Iraq during the Gulf War, while at the same time contributing troops to the coalition forces. Oman has made strenuous efforts to appear neutral in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme. In May 2006, it was reported that Oman had refused to lead a proposed diplomatic mission by the GCC states in which they would have discussed their concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities.57 Oman has called for direct dialogue between the US and Iran, and has said that it has no reason to doubt Iran’s assurances that the purposes of its nuclear activities are entirely peaceful.58
Qatar became a member of the IAEA in 1976 and acceded to the NPT in 1989, but it has not yet concluded a safeguards agreement. Several new IAEA technical-cooperation projects were approved in 2007. These focused on agriculture, radioanalytical techniques, non-destructive testing and the improvement of human resources and technology support in the context of general atomic energy development.
Qatar first began such cooperation with the agency in 2005. Approved projects aim to strengthen monitoring capabilities at its Central Environmental Laboratory and to establish an early warning system for radiation emergencies, along with a network for continuous monitoring of the level of gamma radiation over Qatar. In addition, the Supreme Council for the Environment and Natural Reserves (SCENR) signed a practical cooperation arrangement with the IAEA in June 2007 in which the agency would advise Qatar on physical protection measures for nuclear facilities; help to provide equipment for the prevention and detection of criminal acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material; and provide information related to illicit trafficking and other unauthorised activities.
Qatar has sought to press its case for its selection as the location for a joint GCC reactor. Following a January 2008 meeting in Doha on the joint GCC programme. SCENR Secretary – General Khaled Ghanem al-Ali stated that Qatar was ready to host a nuclear power plant as part of the joint project, although a political decision would depend on the results of an IAEA feasibility study.
In addition, Qatar has explored the establishment of its own separate and independent nuclear – energy programme. Qatari officials reportedly stated in April 2007 that they anticipated launching a power programme within a decade for the purposes of electricity generation and/or desalination. Although a senior official stated that Qatar was evaluating whether nuclear power would be an economical option, another was quoted as saying that there is now a queue forming for nuclear reactors worldwide. More countries are going to joint it so it would be best to get into that line now. If Qatar did launch a nuclear-energy programme, SCENR would serve as the country’s nuclear regulator.59 In November 2007, Qatar announced that it had set up a National Centre for Nuclear Information in order to facilitate the exchange of scientific and technical research concerning atomic energy. This centre has been operating under SCENR, and will work in coordination with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Information System network.
Qatar has sought assistance for its nuclear development from abroad, particularly from Japan and South Korea, the largest importers of its natural gas. It is alleged that Qatari officials expressed their interest in acquiring a research reactor from South Korea, with al-Ali stating publicly that his organisation was evaluating the human resource development needed for such a project. Korean officials are apparently considering the Hanaro 30MVt research reactor as a model for export. Both sides apparently also reached an understanding on further cooperation on the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation and desalination.60 In 2007 Qatar also asked Japan for technical support for its nuclear energy plans but was advised first to study nuclear security and non-proliferation issues before establishing such a programme.61 In January 2008, French power company EDF signed a memorandum with Qatar to discuss cooperation on nuclear-power production and renewable-energy generation.
Qatar possesses the third-largest natural-gas reserves in the world and its proven oil reserves will ensure continued output at current levels for 25 years. In light of these fossile-fuel resources, the reason for Qatar’s interest in nuclear energy may be less focused on economics than that of other Gulf states, and at least partly based on its perception of its strategic vulnerabilities. A long-standing rivalry with its larger neighbour Saudi Arabia stems from territorial disputes, the Qatari broadcaster Al-Jazeera’s criticism of the kingdom, differences over alleged Saudi support for the previous Emir of Qatar and Saudi interference in proposed natural gas pipelines between Qatar and its neighbours.62 Relations improved in March 2008 when Crown Prince Sultan visited Qatar for three days and a Saudi ambassador was reappointed to Doha following lengthy negotiations. But Saudi – Qatari tensions may still have contributed to Qatar’s decision to pursue its own nuclear plans independently of the collective efforts of the GCC, an organisation which some suspect is a vehicle for Saudi domination of the Arabian Peninsula.
Qatar’s size and minimal armed forces (the second smallest in the Middle East after Bahrain) means that it effectively depends on external assistance for its defence. Although Qatar has not purchased significant American weapons systems, it is a strategic ally of the US and has signed defence pacts with the US, UK and France (which has supplied some 80% of its weaponry). During the 1990s, Qatar effectively offered to replace Saudi Arabia as the main US operational hub in the Gulf region by constructing a large air base, despite lacking an air force of its own. The US Combat Air Operation Center for the Middle East moved to Qatar’s Al-Udeid Airbase in April 2003. Qatar hosts CENTCOM Forward Headquarters.63
Like many of its neighbours, Qatar has sought to maintain good relations with Iran, with whom it shares the North Field/South Pars natural-gas deposit off the Qatari coast. In 2006, Qatar was the only member of the UN Security Council to vote against Resolution 1696, which mandated Iran to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities. Although Qatar later agreed to impose sanctions against Iran in Resolutions 1737 and 1747, in March 2007 it publicly refused the use of its territory in any future US attack. Qatar is doubtless aware that CENTCOM facilities would be an obvious target for any retaliation for such an attack. The US has stationed PAC-3 missiles to protect its bases in Qatar against Iranian ballistic missiles; one PAC-3 missile was accidentally launched in October 2007. Qatar’s sense of vulnerability would not have been eased by Iranian warnings that US bases would be prime candidates for attack in the eventuality of American air strikes against its nuclear programme. In May 2006, Ahmadinejad publicly criticised the Emir of Qatar for referring to the ‘Arabic Persian Gulf.’ Qatar may have reason to fear that Iran could encroach on its shared natural gas deposits after the Iranian deputy oil minister stated in 2004 that Qatar was producing more than her right share from the gas field.64
Qatar has encouraged increased dialogue between Iran and the GCC states. It invited Ahmadinejad to the GCC summit in December 2007, making him the first Iranian president to take part in such an event and frustrating American attempts to isolate Iran. At the 2007 IISS Manama Dialogue, Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani stated that he did not think that we can solve our problem through trying to seal Iran off from the regionâ€¦ What is very important is that no-one tries to dominate the region.65 He also attempted to downplay tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, the islands dispute and the correct name for the Gulf. At the same time, while encouraging the US to talk to Iran, he warned that GCC states would not want to be part of the package, a reference to the concern that, in return for ceding its nuclear programme, the US, with the Europeans, would grant Iran a greater role in regional security. Qatar’s nuclear plans fit into a pattern in which it seeks to remain on favourable terms with both America and Iran, while avoiding dependency on any one external power.
United Arab Emirates:
The UAE became a member of the IAEA in 1976 and acceded to the NPT in 1995. It signed a safeguards agreement with an SQP in December 2002, which came into force in October 2003. Since the late 1970s, the UAE has periodically expressed an interest in nuclear energy, although no firm decisions have ever been taken. Compared to most of its GCC neighbours, the UAE has a long history of technical-cooperation projects with the IAEA. These projects have generally focused on medical and agricultural applications, as well as the development of regulatory infrastructure for radiation and waste safety, and have entailed the transfer of equipment such as spectrometers, detectors and calibration sources. The IAEA currently has six active projects in the UAE, including one approved in 2005 to assess the technical and economical feasibility of a desalination and nuclear power plant.
Beyond the collective efforts of the GCC, the UAE has been pursuing its own nuclear plans. During a visit to the UAEA in January 2008, Sarkozy signed a framework agreement with the UAE federal government for nuclear cooperation in various fields, including nuclear power. The agreement was under Euratom review in spring 2008, with a view to being submitted to parliament within the calendar year. Concurrent with Sarkozy’s visit, French companies Total, Suez and Areva indicated an interest in supplying an integrated nuclear power generation project comprising two 1,600MWe European Pressurised Reactors and fuel-cycle products and services. The power plants, estimated to cost £4 billion, would be located in Abu Dhabi and could conceivably come online around 2017, assuming three years for the feasibility studies and licencing process, and six years for construction. Any such project would require substantial investment by the UAE in nuclear-related physical infrastructure, domestic expertise, legislation and regulation and security, which the UAE has begun to put in place. However, no actual contract has yet been signed, and the UAE is expected to open the project to international tenders before making any commitments.66
France is not the only country pursuing nuclear-energy deals with the UAE. In April 2008, stating its desire to set a good example for the region, the UAE signed an MoU with the United States on nuclear-energy cooperation. The UAE and the US also affirmed their interest in negotiating a nuclear-cooperation agreement (called a 123 agreement’ after Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act). In addition to discussions with American firms, in 2005 the UAE reportedly held discussions with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute regarding the possible export of a small pressurised water reactor and undertook the initial stages of a pre-feasibility study, although it was unclear whether the UAE was interested in constructing this particular reactor.67 During an official visit to the UAE in May 2006, then South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun said that the two countries were working together to build such a reactor for desalination purposes. However, this experimental Korean reactor project now seems to have stalled.
Although endowed with the fifth-largest proven oil reserves in the Middle East and the fifth-largest natural-gas reserves in the world, the UAE must accommodate a steady growth in its population and tourist numbers: demand for electricity is expected to increase by 10% annually through to 2010.68 As well as its plans for nuclear energy, the emirate of Abu Dhabi has launched a multibillion-dollar initiative to exploit alternative technologies, and has announced plans for a 500MWe solar power plant. Yet the UAE also faces strategic threats that may have informed its decision to explore a national nuclear programme.
A territorial dispute concerning the Abu Musa and Tunbs islands continues to simmer between the UAE and Iran. The latter seized control of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and part of Abu Musa in 1971. Abu Musa was shared between the two states in a bilateral agreement of the same year, but Iran went on to assert complete control over the rest of the island in 1992. Given its previous history of territorial encroachments, the UAE has reason to fear that Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities could encourage it to act even more assertively in the region.
The UAE has made efforts to ensure that its relations with Iran remain cordial. Around a quarter of Dubai’s population is comprised of Iranian citizens or people of Iranian origin, and Iran is the largest market for Dubai’s non-oil exports. IN an efforts to avoid international sanctions against their nuclear programme, many Iranians have transferred their capital and financial activities to the UAE. In May 2007, one day after the departure of US Vice-President Dick Cheney, Ahmadinejad made the first visit by an Iranian leader to the UAE since independence in 1971 and led a raucous anti-American rally, strongly attended by expatriate Iranians. The UAE fears that the large Iranian population in the emirate of Dubai has strong sympathies with the Islamic Republic and could pose a threat to national stability by acting as an Iranian ‘fifth column’.69 In general, authorities in Dubai remain keen to maintain strong economic (and, therefore, political) links with Iran, while those in the federal capital of Abu Dhabi, who hold more direct responsibility for foreign and defence policy, are more concerned about Iranian claims to UAE frontiers and the potential dominance of Iran in the region, and are subsequently more keen on finding ways to contain Iran without provoking it.
The UAE has publicly forbidden the US from using bases in its country to attack or spy on Iran. During; large – scale US naval exercises in the Gulf in March 2007, UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed declared that we have assured the brothers in Iranâ€¦that we are not a party in its dispute with the United States, that we will not allow any force to use our territories for military, security and espionage activities against Iran.70 At the December 2007 GCC summit, two private meetings were held between the Iranian and UAE presidents and foreign ministers respectively; at least one of these dealt with the sovereignty of the Abu Musa and Tunbs island.71 Iran had previously argued that the issue should be discussed bilaterally, while the UAE had wished to discuss it in a multilateral format or refer it to international arbitration. The fact that the UAE arranged bilateral talks suggests that it is eager not to antagonise Iran. The UAE is clearly concerned about the potential consequences that any US attack on Iran might have on its security. Yet at the same time, it is keen to maintain its own military deterrent against Iran.
The UAE has military ties to several Western states. It signed a bilateral defence pact with the US in 1994, and America makes use of the Al Dhafra airbase as a centre for aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, and as a staging ground for tankers, unmanned aerial vehicles and surveillance aircraft. Britain’s Defence Cooperation Agreement with the UAE is the UK’s largest defence commitment outside of NATO.72 France reaffirmed its defence pact with the UAE when it recently agreed to establish a permanent military base manned by around 500 personnel in Abu Dhabi. In February 2008, France, the UAE and Qatar held point exercises in the Gulf. From an examination of the UAE’s recent defence purchases, it could be inferred that it is seeking to strengthen its military deterrent against Iran’s growing nuclear capability. In December 2007, the US administration notified Congress of a proposed sale to the UAE, worth up to $9bn, which would include PAE-3 missiles designed to intercept theatre ballistic missiles. Congress was also notified of a possible sale of upgrades and refurbishment for three E-2C airborne early warning aircraft, the total value of which could amount to $437m. In addition to the sale of defensive equipment, the US has apparently helped to establish an air-warfare centre in the UAE, where Gulf states can train their fighter pilots and participate in joint exercises in order to improve interoperability. By the end of 2008, the UAE will have taken delivery of the last of 80 Block 60 F-16 aircraft purchased from the US. Along with highly advanced precision-strike weapons, the total package will cost around $8bn. The procurement of the Black Shaheen cruise missile allows UAE aircraft to deliver long range precision munitions. The US recently announced its intention to supply the UAE with 200 JDAM tail kits.
The UAE has a long history as a location for proliferation related activities, and Dubai served as a hub for the A.Q. Khan network and a transshipment point for the Iraqi and Iranian national nuclear-procurement networks. It is suspected that the UAE, and particularly Dubai, is still a way-station for illicit nuclear imports into Iran and possibly Pakistan. By late 2007, however, the UAE had reportedly begun to increase restrictions on Iranian businesses and enforce new export-control laws through inspections of cargo bound for Iran, although many Iranian firms continue to do business there. The authorities in Abu Dhabi have stressed that they would be strict in their application of any multilaterally agreed sanctions against Iran, even if that required them to put pressure on the authorities in Dubai. As noted above, the nuclear reactors under discussion with France would not be in Dubai, but rather Abu Dhabi.
The UAE is likely to be the first state in the Middle East beyond Iran to produce nuclear energy. It has the financial resources to procure power plants, the foreign expertise required to help manage such a project and the political will to see it through to its conclusion. UAE officials understand the legal and technical requirements for safe and secure nuclear power generation and are moving ahead in a determined fashion to put the necessary institutional arrangements in place. In March 2008, the UAE cabinet endorsed a policy statement on the development of nuclear energy, which was described as a commercially competitive option. The UAE stated its commitment to complete operational transparency and to the highest standards of non-proliferation, including the ratification of the Additional Protocol and international nuclear-safety instruments, and the adoption of the Nuclear Suppliers Group export guidelines. The statement, released as a white paper in April, outlined various commitments that would be undertaken if the decision were made to establish a nuclear-power programme, including, renouncing and domestic reprocessing or enrichment capability in favour of a long-term and secure external supply of nuclear fuel; developing only advanced third-generation light-water reactors. The UAE stated that it hoped to promote these principles within the GCC nuclear initiative, and to establish a new model for non-nuclear states to explore and develop nuclear energy with the full support of the international community.73
To underscore the contrast with Iran and to demonstrate that opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme is based only on proliferation grounds Western governments are keen to support Abu Dhabi’s quest for nuclear power. The UAE’s emerging status as a non-proliferation model, in contrast to its recent history as a hub for the black market, also demonstrates the extent to which a country that makes the right non-proliferation decisions can reap the benefits of nuclear technology.
There are technologies under development to convert the ‘associated gas’ to a liquid form so that it could be exported. The OECD International Energy Agency and the IAEA judge that gas-to-liquid technology will be available commercially by around 2018. Qatar currently has a number of gas-to-liquid plants under construction or in the planning stage. It effective, this technology could make nuclear energy in the Gulf cost-efficient earlier than 2025, if the oil price remained above $50 per barrel.
Mohammad Ezz Al Deen, ‘Gulf Nuclear Plans Take Shape, Says al Attiyah’, Gulf News, 6 February 2007.
Mark Hibbs, ‘Arab Gulf States Await IAEA Report on Nuclear Power Plans Next Month’, Nucleonic Work, 20 September 2007.
Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, ‘A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours’, Survival, Vol. 49, no.2, Summer 2007, p.12.
See Nicole Strake, ‘Nuclear Development in the Gulf: A Strategic or Economic Necessity? ,Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin, December 2007, pp.4-11.
Karin Maree, ‘French Deals Threaten GCC Nuclear Plans’, Middle East Economic Digest, 18 January 2008.
James Calderwood, ‘Persian Gulf States to Move Ahead with Nuclear Energy Plans,’ Associated Press, 11 Feburary 2007.
See Emile El-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, ‘The Arab Gulf States in the shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, Working Paper, Henry L. Stimson Center, 26 May 2006, http//www.stimson.org/swa/pdf/ StimsoIranGCCWorking Paper. Pdf, p.19.
Richard Beeston, ‘Saudis Warn Iran That its Nuclear Plan Risks Disaster” The Times, 16January 2006.
‘An Islamic Nuclear Arms Race?, jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, September 2007; ‘Friendlier Hands Across the Gulf, Economist, 19 December 2007.
Robert Gates, ‘The US and the Regional Balance of Power’, remarks to the 4th HSS Manama Dialogue. Bahrain, 8 December 2007, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-iiss-regional-security-summit/first-plenary-session/address-by-the-hon-robert-gates.
Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, University of Maryland/Zogby International 2006 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey, 8 February 2007, www.bsos.umd.edu/sadat/2006% 2oArab% 2oOpinion%2oSurvey.ppt.
Michael Smith, ‘Iran Threatens Gulf Blitz If US Hits Nuclear Plants’ ,Sunday Times, 10june2007. Iranian news agencies later denied that the official had ever threatened the Gulf states themselves as distinct from the US bases on their territories. See ‘Iran: We’ll Hit States That Aid US Attacks Against US,’ Jerusalem Post, 12June 2007.
The following sections on Saudi Arabi’s nuclear history, infrastructure, applications and resources draw on Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, ‘The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors’, in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (eds), Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carliste, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005). PP.21-88; Yana Feklman, ‘Country Profile 8: Saudi Arabia; Stockhohn International Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/ cnscisam.html;and ‘Saudi Arabia’ ,Jane’s chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Assessments Countrie, R S, pp 15-23.
SRK Quantities Uranium and Ultrium Resource at Gurayyah Tantalum-Niobium Deposit’, Tertiary Minerals PLC, news release, 19 April 2006, http://www.tertiaryminerals.com/news190406htm: ‘Tertiary Lifts Share Suspension and Provides Update on Gurayyah Licence progress’, Tertiary Minerals PLC, news release; 9july 2007, http://www. tertiaryminerals.com/download/RNS%2oGhurayyah%20release% 2000907.pdf.
‘Kingdom Signs IAEA Agreement on Nuclear Material’, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in London, 17June 2005. http://www.mofa. gov.sa/Detail.asp? inSectionID=42&InNewsltemID=36697.
George Jahn, ‘Saudis Exempt from Nuke Inspections’, Associated press, 16 June 2005.
Marie Colvin, ‘How an Insider Lifted the Veil on Saudi Plot for an “Islamic Bomb” ‘Sunday Times, 24 July 1994;Marie Colvin, ‘Britain’s Gulf War Ally Helped Saddam Build a Nuclear Bomb’, Sunday Times, 24July 1994:Steve Coll and John Mintz, ‘Saudi Aid to Iraqi A-Bomb Alleged’, Washington Post, 25July 1994.
BSS discussion with Middle Eastern ex-government official, January 2008;Wyn Q. Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation (Basingstoke:Macmillan,2000), pp.16-18;Thomas W. Lippman, ‘Saudi Arabia: The Calculations of Uncertainty’, in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B.Reiss (eds), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), PP.111-16.
Anthony 11. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses and Challenges (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), p,252.
Richard L Russel, ‘A Saudi Nuclear Option? ,Survival, vol. 43. No. 2, Summer 2001, p.74.
Martin S. Navias, Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East (London: Brassey’s, 1993), pp.56-9, 72; Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic missile Nonproliferation, pp.16-18.
HSS discussion with Middle Eastern ex-government official, January 2008.
Cordesman and Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses and Challenges, pp.249-251.
Ze’ev Schiffe, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Middle East; The View from Isral’, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, March 2003, p.12, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/ publication/schiff_iraqi.pdf;Lippman, ‘Saudi Arabia:The Calculations of Uncertainty’, p.116.
Schiff, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Middle East: The View from Israel’,p.11.
Peter Kammerer, ‘nuclear Deterrent Deal Fuelled by oil; Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s Agreement is Mutually Beneficial, Experts Believe’, South China Morning Post, 3 November 2003.
See Simon Henderson, ‘Toward a Saudi Nuclear Option: The Saudi-Pakistani Summit’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy watch 793, 16 October 2003: and Thomas Woodrow, ‘The Sino-Saudi Connection’, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, vol.2, no. 21, 24 October 2002. Henderson describes the spectator as being a son of Crown Prince Abdullah, while Woodrow suggests it was Defense Minister Prince Sultan.
‘US Report Confirms Saudi-Pakistan Nuke Contacts’, World Tribune.com, 1 August 2002, http;//www.worldtribune.com/ worldtribune/WTARC/2002/me_saudis_o8_o1.html.
Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor, ‘Saudis Consider Nuclear Bomb’, Guardian, 18 September 2003.
Henderson, ‘Toward a Saudi Nuclear Option: The Saudi-Pakistani Summit.’
‘Saudi Arabia Does Not Seek Nuclear Weapons’, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington DC, press release, 18 September 2003.http://www.saudiembassy.net/2003News/press/PressDetail.asp?cYear=2003&cIndex=128; ‘Iran and its Neighbours’, HSS Strategic Comments, vol.11, no.6, November 2005.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, ‘Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in Secret Nuke pact’,Washington Times, 22 October 2003.
David R.Sands, ‘Israeli General Says Saudis Seek to Buy Pakistani Nukes’, Washington Times, 23 October 2003.
Henderson, ‘Toward a Saudi Nuclear Option: The Saudi-Pakistani Summit’: Patrick Clawson, ‘Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East:Who is Next after Iran? ‘Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. 1 April 2003.http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/Presentation030401% 2oClawson% 2oNuclear%2oProlif%2oTB.pdf,pp.5-6.
William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ‘With Eye on Iran, Rivals Also Want Nuclear Power’, New York Times, 15 April 2007.
US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, ‘Country Analysis Briefs: Saudi Arabia’, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ emeu/cabs/Saudi_Arabia/Full.html.
Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses’, Congressional Research Service Report, RL 32048, 6August 2007, pp.22-3.
It should be noted that this is part of a long-term trend of extensive US arms sales to the Saudis. Between 1981 and 2006, the US sold over $57bn of weapons, training and equipment to Saudi Arabia. See Christopher M. Blanchard and Richard F. Grimmett, ‘The Gulf Security Dialogue and Related Arms Sale Proposals’, Congressional Research Service Report, RL34322, 14 January 2008, p.1.
Alfred B. Prados and Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and US Relations’, Congressional Research Service Report, RL33533, 13 April 2007. Pp.12-13.
Rachel Bronson, ‘What Saudi Arabia Wants: Good Neighbors’, The New Republic Online, 3April 2007, http://2o22.214.171.124/doc.mhtml? pt=k1kvxQih7a8Y5WB4pyBdbs%3D%3D.
‘Keynote Address to Delegates by HRH Prince Muqrin Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’, 3rd HSS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue, 8 December 2006, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-iiss-regional-security-summit/the-manama-dialogue2006/opening -dinner-keynote-address-2006/hrh-prince-muqrin-bin-abdulaziz-al-saud/;Roula Khalaf, ‘Gulf Arabs Weigh Joint Nuclear Programme’, Financial Times, 10 December 2006.
‘Saudi Arabia-and the New Vision of the Nuclear Age’, Al-Eqtisadialt, November 2006, http://www.aleqt.com/article.php?do=show&cid=3995 (in Arabic).
Lally Weymouth, ‘Changes in the Kingdom-On “Our Timetable’ Washington Post, 27 February 2005.
Cited by Lippman, ‘Saudi Arabia: The Calculations of Uncertainty’., p.129.
Bradely Bowman, ‘Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East’, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, February 2oo8, p.viii.
Dennis Ross, ‘Middle East Muddle’, The National Interest, November December 2007.
US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, ‘Country Analysis Briefs: Bahrain: Electricity’, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ cabs/Bahrain/Electricity.html.
Kenneth Katzman, ‘Bharain: Key Issues for US Policy’, Congressional Research Service Report, 95-1013 F, 24 March 2005, pp.1-2,6.
Samir Nasif, ‘Bahraini Envoy to UK Highlights Dangers of Nuclear Arms in Israel, Iran’, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 18 September 2007. Via BBC Monitoring 19 September 2007.
Giles Whittell, ‘Bahrain Accuses Iran of Nuclear Weapons Lie’, The Times, 2November 2007.
David Blair, ‘Bahrain Fears its Success Could Be at Risk as Iran Tension Rises’, Daily Telegraph, 2 November 2007:Strake, ‘Nuclear Development in the Gulf: A Strategic or Economic Necessity?, p.4.
‘Kuwait May Go Nuclear’, Arab Times, 11 January 1992.
Kenneth Katzman, ‘Kuwait: Post-Saddam Issues and US policy, Congressional Research Service Report, Rs 21513, 29 June 2005, p.1.
Kenneth Katzman, ‘Oman: Reform, Security, and US Policy’, Congressional Research Service Report, RS 21534, 28 June 2005, p.1.
Ibid, pp. 1-6; HSS, The Military Balance 2006 (Abingdon: Routledge for the HSS), p.20.
Christian Chaise, ‘Oman shows solidarity with Iran in Nuclear Standoff: Analysis’, Agence France-Press, 27May 2006.
Mark Hibbs, ‘Qatar Evaluating Nuclear Row’, Agency France-Press; 19May2006.
Ibid; ‘Peaceful Nuclear Application Meet is S: Korea Hails Qatar’s Efforts’, The Peninsula, 29 April 2007. http://www.the peninsulaqatar. com/Display_news.asp?section=Local_News&month=April2007&file=Local_News2007o42962248&ml.
‘Qatar Seeks Japan’s Support for Developing Nuclear Energy’, Agency France-Press, 1May 2007.
Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘Qatar: Background and US Relations’, Congressional Research Service Report, RL 31718 10 October 2007, pp.15-16.
Ibid: US Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Alfairs, ‘Background Note: Qatar’, July 2007.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ bgn/5437.hlm.
Katzman, ‘Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses /p.23.
Katzman, ‘Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses’, p.23.
Ali Khalid, ‘Gulf Countries Speak Out Against Military option in Iran’, Agency France-Press, 8 December 2007; IISS News, Winter 2007.
Anne MacLachlan, ‘French Companies Propose Building, Operating Two EPRs in UAE’, Nucleonics Week, 17 January 2007; Mark Hibbs, ‘Persian Gulf States Not Expected to Decide Quickly on Power Reactors’, Nucleonics Week, 24 January 2008.
Mark Hibbs, ‘Kaeri’s Smart P. Project Delayed by Financing, Licensing Issues’, Nucleonics Week, 8 December 2005.
US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, ‘Country Analysis Briefs: United Arab Emirates’, July 2007, http:/www. Eia.doe.gov/cabs/UAE/Full.html.
Kenneth Katzman, ‘The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy’, Congressional Research Service Report, RS21852, 1 May 2007, p.5.
Jim Krane, ‘Gulf Arabs Distance Themselves from US Threats Against Iran’, Associated Press, 28 March 2007.
Mohammed Almezel, ‘UAE and Iranian Leaders Hold Private Meeting’, Gulf News, 3 December 2007.
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Country Profile: United Arab Emirates’, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profile= intRelations$pg=4.
Mohammad Bin Rashid Chairs Cabinet Meeting’, Emirates News Agency, 24 March 2008, http://uaeinteract.com/docs/Mohammed_bin Rashid_chairs_cabinet_meeting/29268.htm.